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TAKING RESPONSIBILITY, PASSING THE
BUCK, AND CLEANING UP THE MESS:
MAKING MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA WORK
I. INTRODUCrION
Americans thrive on convenience. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that a "throw away" mentality has become the pervasive Amer-
ican attitude with respect to the disposal of everyday household
garbage.' Years ago, the greatest dilemma Americans faced regard-
ing the disposal of their garbage was deciding who was going to
carry it down to the curb. Once it was placed there, its final desti-
nation became someone else's problem. Or so we thought. Unfortu-
nately, however, the problem has run a full circle and our garbage
has returned to haunt us.
Garbage collected from households is referred to as municipal
solid waste (MSW).2 Americans generate approximately 180 mil-
lion tons of municipal garbage a year,3 three quarters of which
goes to landfills.' Everyday household garbage, once considered
1. Jonathan P. Meyers, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involve-
ment as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEo. L.J. 567, 567
(1991) (commenting that disposable products, such as razors, pens, fast food containers,
and baby bottles dominate American society because of their convenience).
2. Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Haz-
ardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197, 200 (1988). According to the EPA defini-
tion, MSW is the "solid waste generated primarily by households, but may include some
contribution of wastes from commercial, institutional and industrial sources as well."
Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,074
(1989) [hereinafter Interim Municipal Settlement Policy].
3. Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the United States:. 1990 Update, 55
Fed. Reg. 24,926, 24,927 (1990). In 1988, Americans produced four pounds of solid
waste per person each day, this figure is expected to rise to 4.41 pounds by the year
2000. Id. The amount of garbage generated per person per day is subject to variation.
This variation is caused by such factors as the degree of urbanization, the season, the
level of economic activity, and the average income level, with lower income households
reportedly producing higher quantities of waste due to consumption of products with more
packaging. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 201 & nn.7-10.
4. The states have adopted four ways in which MSW may be disposed: source reduc-
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harmless, does in fact contain traces of hazardous substances.6
Given the volume of garbage thrown away, these small concentra-
tions of hazardous substances, when aggregated, become harmful to
both human health and the environment.7
In the past several years, the liability of municipalities,8 under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),9 for the disposal of everyday
tion, recycling, incineration, and landfilling. Meyers, supra note 1, at 570. However,
landfilling is the predominant disposal method. Id. This Note focuses on the liability that
municipalities may incur as a result of disposing of MSW at landfills.
5. See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 202.
6. Id. ('The home garbage pail is a leaking sieve of toxic and potentially toxic chem-
ical agents."). Common household products containing hazardous substances include pesti-
cides, paints, detergents, oven cleaners, and insecticides. Id.
7. See, e.g., Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1467 (1986) (noting that
the disposal of hazardous wastes in landfills can lead to groundwater contamination) [here-
inafter Toxic Waste Litigation]; see also Gregory P. Barton, RCRA Leachate Testing Regu-
lations: Is the Groundwater Safe? Are We Safe?, 22 ENVTL. L. 387, 388 (1991) (com-
menting that groundwater contamination occurs when hazardous waste comes into contact
with rainwater, creating a toxic leakage which seeps through the soil into the groundwa-
ter). Approximately one-half of the U.S. population relies on groundwater for drinking. Id.
In addition, the decomposition of garbage produces methane gas which can accumulate in
nearby buildings and eventually cause explosions. Julie Jones Thompson, Municipal Solid
Waste Management: The States Must Pick Up Where Congress Left Off, 23 AKRON L.
REV. 587, 589 (1990). Although MSW contains smaller concentrations of hazardous sub-
stances than waste from other sources, the tremendous volume of MSW at landfills pro-
duces large quantities of potentially toxic substances. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 210.
8. For purposes of this Note, the term "municipalities" refers to "any political subdi-
vision of a State and may include cities, counties, towns, townships, and other local gov-
ernmental entities.' Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, supra note 2, at 51,074.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988). CERCLA, enacted in 1980, is primarily a remedial
statute. It was designed to remedy environmental damages caused by past improper dis-
posal practices, and does so by providing for the clean up of hazardous waste sites that
pose a threat to the public health and environment. CERCLA authorizes the government
to impose and allocate the costs incurred for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Id.
§k 9604-07. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for implementing
CERCLA. In order to evaluate the potential risks posed by hazardous waste sites, thereby
determining the inclusion and priority of the sites placed on the National Priority List
(NPL) and scheduled for remediation, the EPA utilizes a Hazard Ranking System to eval-
uate the potential risks posed by these sites. See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 225-26.
CERCLA liability is triggered when there is a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a waste facility that results in response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)
(1988); see also id. § 9601(22) (defining release); id. § 9601(14) (defining hazardous
substance); id. § 9601(9) (defining facility). Liability under CERCLA focuses on potential-
ly responsible parties (PRPs). CERCLA specifies four categories of persons who may be
deemed PRPs: current owners or operators of hazardous waste facilities, past owners or
operators of hazardous waste facilities; persons who arranged for disposal, treatment, or
transport of hazardous substances (commonly referred to as generators); and transporters of
hazardous substances. Id. § 9607(a).
CERCLA provides two ways in which the EPA may respond to a release or threat-
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household garbage has been a persistent source of controversy.10
This is due both to the severe financial consequences that such
liability will create for municipalities and their residents,"1 and to
the low toxicity of MSW. As a result, some have argued that
municipalities should not be required to bear the burden of envi-
ronmental liability under the current statutory scheme, and that the
allocation of any municipal liability should be altered both to con-
template the unique situation of municipalities 2 and to ease the
liability burden. 3 Other commentators, however, have argued that
ened release of a hazardous substance when an imminent and substantial threat to the
public health or welfare exists. First, the EPA, itself, may commence a response action.
See id. § 9601(25) (defining response); id. § 9604 (describing a response action). Second,
the EPA may initiate an abatement (enforcement) action, and compel responsible parties to
abate the release or threatened release. See id. § 9606 (1988) (describing abatement ac-
tions). CERCLA permits responsible parties to seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under § 9607(a). See id. § 9613(t(1). Currently, the
policy of the EPA is not to initiate § 9606 enforcement actions against municipalities who
generate or transport MSW. See Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, supra note 2, at
51,072. However, the EPA explicitly stated that the Interim Municipal Settlement Policy
does not preclude third parties from initiating contribution actions against municipalities.
Id. at 51,071.
10. Concern regarding municipal liability under CERCLA for the disposal of MSW has
spurred the formation of a national municipal coalition called American Communities for
Clean Up Equity (ACCE). Joshua B. Epel, Evolving Issues Affect Municipal Solid and
Hazardous Waste, 18 CURRENT MUN. PROBLEMS 211, 215 (1991-92). For an overview of
ACCE and its proposal for reform, see Rena L Steinzor & Matthew F. Lintner, Local
Governments and Superfund, 1992 Update: Who Is Paying the Tab?, 24 URB. LAw. 51,
151-55 (1992). The main goal of ACCE is to eliminate liability for the generation and
transportation of MSW and sewage sludge, especially in the context of third-party actions.
Id. at 151. Recent proposed legislation, S. 1557 and H.R. 3026 discussed in part IV,
incorporate ACCE's entire agenda. See Steinzor & Lintner, supra, at 154.
11. Municipal liability under CERCLA for the disposal of MSW is particularly threat-
ening because participation in a CERCLA suit or settlement of a CERCLA claim can
strain the financial resources of a municipality. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying
text.
12. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 2, at 273 (noting that municipalities may have diffi-
culty in obtaining insurance coverage, they inevitably play some role in the handling of
MSW, and they are inhibited in their ability to settle and can encounter substantial trans-
action costs in the settlement process).
13. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 2, § IX (proposing criteria for a flexible and equitable
approach to municipal liability and suggesting ways in which the aggregate amount of
municipal liability can be reduced); Molly A. Meegan, Municipal Liability for Household
Hazardous Waste: An Analysis of the Superfnd Statute and Its Policy Implications, 79
GEo. LJ. 1783, 1786 (1991) (discussing ways in which liability can be tailored to consid-
er the unique characteristics of municipalities); G. Nelson Smith Il, Trashing the Town
and Making It Pay: The Problem With the Municipal Liability Scheme Under CERCLA,
26 CONN. L REv. 585, 607-08 (1994) (suggesting that municipality's share of liability be
satisfied from the Superfund in instances where the municipality had arranged for the
disposal of MSW and could demonstrate that it had sent the waste to a landfill with a
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the current liability standard should be retained, and that municipal-
ities should contribute to the costs of environmental clean-ups in
the same manner as other responsible parties. 4
However, little effort has been made to develop a comprehen-
sive solution encompassing both facets of the municipal liability
dilemma. Any solution must necessarily be two-tiered. First, it
must resolve what is perhaps the biggest problem municipalities
now face: their liability under CERCLA for past disposal of MSW.
Second, and perhaps just as important, it must both alter current
municipal waste disposal practices and eliminate, or at least sub-
stantially reduce, potential future municipal liability by mandating
safe disposal practices from the outset.
This Note begins by acknowledging that municipalities are
liable under CERCLA for the disposal of MSW. However, it then
proposes that the current systems of cleanup cost allocation and
provision of funds (Superfund) must be modified to provide sepa-
rate funding for municipal liability and to spread the burden of
municipal liability equitably among residents of all municipalities.
Part II of this Note discusses B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,5 a
landmark Second Circuit decision that held municipalities liable
under CERCLA for the disposal of MSW that contained hazardous
substances. Part IllI examines the consequences of municipal liabili-
ty under the current system and argues that individual municipal
liability is inherently inequitable. Part IV analyzes several recent
proposals that address the problem of municipal liability, and ar-
gues that each necessarily fails to solve the problem. Part V pro-
poses that the current Superfund scheme be modified, and a
"Munfund" that provides solely and collectively for the costs of
municipal liability be established to equitably distribute liability. It
also recognizes that in conjunction with a provision for funding of
current municipal liability, efforts must now be made to alter cur-
rent disposal practices and to reduce future potential municipal
liability. This Note concludes that the creation of a "Munfund"
would be a wise and necessary reform to the current scheme of
good faith belief that the landfill was in compliance with environmental regulations).
14. See, e.g., Norman A. Dupont, Municipal Solid Waste: The Endless Disposal of
American Municipalities Meets the CERCLA Strict Liability Dragon, 24 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1183, § IV (1991) (asserting that municipalities should be subject to liability under
the current liability standard, and proposing that municipalities combat future liability by
implementing source reduction and recycling programs).
15. B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
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municipal liability.
IL B.F. GOODRICH Co. V. MURTHA: LANDMARK AND LAND MINE
B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, a recent Second Circuit decision,
held that municipalities are subject to CERCLA liability for the
disposal of MSW that contains substances considered hazardous.'
The case consisted of four consolidated actions" concerning the
cleanup of two Connecticut landfills, Beacon Heights and Laurel
Park.'8 These actions were filed against the alleged owners and
operators of the sites, collectively referred to as "Murtha,"'9 for
cleanup costs. Murtha then commenced third party actions against
approximately two hundred parties, including twenty-four municipal
entities. Murtha alleged that the municipalities had arranged for
the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the two sites,
and therefore were liable pursuant to Section 9607(a)(3)2" for a
portion of the cleanup costs z
The court began its discussion with a brief overview of the
statutory framework of CERCLA.za The two primary goals of
16. See infra note 43 for the CERCLA definition of "hazardous."
17. In 1987, actions were filed by the EPA, the State of Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection, the Uniroyal Chemical Company, and the B.F. Goodrich Compa-
ny and other members of its coalition. Id. at 1196.
18. ld. The EPA, pursuant to CERCLA, placed these two sites on the National Priority
List (NPL). B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 961 (D. Conn. 1991).
19. "Murtha" includes Harold Murtha, Terrence Murtha, Murtha Trucking Inc., Murtha
Enterprises, Inc., Murtha Waste Control Corporation, Rubber Avenue Enterprises, Inc.,
Beacon Heights, Inc., and Laurel Park, Inc.. Id. at 961.
20. Id. at 962 & n.3. Subsequently, the original plaintiffs were permitted to amend
their complaints and add the third party defendants to the original action. Id. at 964 n.5.
21. This section deems as potentially liable under CERCLA
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances .
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
22. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1196. In 1992, the cleanup costs of the sites were
estimated to exceed S47.9 million. Id. The municipal defendants denied liability, and
moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, their generation and
collection of MSW did not subject them to CERCLA liability. The district court denied
this motion, and the municipal defendants appealed. Id. at 1197.
23. Id. at 1197. Congress enacted CERCLA in an attempt to strengthen the EPA's
authority to respond effectively and promptly to situations that threatened human health
and the environment. Id. CERCLA authorizes the EPA to initiate "response actions" to
abate an actual or threatened release of hazardous substances. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a)(1)). Response actions include remedial actions to prevent or reduce releases and
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CERCLA are to enable the EPA to respond effectively and prompt-
ly to hazardous situations and to hold the responsible parties liable
for the attendant cleanup costs.24 Liability under CERCLA is both
strict and joint and severaL26 The scope of CERCLA liability is
broad,27 and extends to all those who contribute to the problems
caused by hazardous substances and to the landowners.Os
A prima facie case under CERCLA requires that five elements
be established? First, the defendant must fall under one of the
four categories of potentially respoisible parties (PRPs) enumerated
in Section 9607(a) ° Second, the plaintiff must show that the site
is a facility. Third, the plaintiff must prove that there is a re-
lease or threatened release of hazardous substances at the facili-
ty 2 Fourth, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it incurred re-
sponse costs as a result of the release or threatened release?3 Fi-
nally, the plaintiff must show that both its costs and response
the removal of the hazardous substance from the site entirely. Id. Under CERCLA, the
EPA may also seek to compel PRPs to initiate private response actions when there is an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a)). These parties are then entitled to recover a portion of the response costs they
incurred as a result of the cleanup from other PRPs. 1d. at 1197-98 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)).
24. Id. at 1198 (commenting that a liberal interpretation of the statute is necessary to
achieve these goals).
25. Id. There are only three potential affirmative defenses to CERCLA liability. (1) an
act of God, (2) an act of war, or (3) an act or omission of a third party other than one
with whom a defendant has a contractual relationship. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)).
26. Id. Since liability is joint and several, each defendant can be individually liable for
the entire cost of cleanup. Carroll E. Dubuc & William D. Evans, Jr., Recent Develop-
ments Under CERCLA: Toward a More Equitable Distribution of Lfability, 17 EWNVTL .
REP. 10197, 10197 (1987). Since municipalities can only currently be liable through third
party contribution actions, the extent of their liability will depend on the manner in which
the cleanup costs are apportioned.
27. See supra note 10 (discussing the categories of persons who may be deemed PRPs
under CERCLA).
28. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1198.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also supra note 9.
31. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1198. Section 9601(9) defines facility as
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including
any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond,
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but
does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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actions conform to the National Contingency Plan34 The liability
of the municipal defendants in B.F. Goodrich turned on whether
their actions of arranging for MSW disposal satisfied elements one
and three?'
The court quickly disposed of the issue presented by the first
element, whether a municipality may be liable for arranging for the
disposal of hazardous substances.36 Because CERCLA expressly
includes municipalities in its definition of those who may be liable
under Section 9607, there was no question that a municipality
may be liable as a PRP if it arranges for the disposal of hazardous
substances."
The court then proceeded to address the third element, wheth-
er MSW is a hazardous substance under CERCLA?9 The defen-
dant municipalities first argued that CERCLA's silence regarding
MSW indicated a congressional intent to exclude it from the defi-
nition of hazardous substance. The court rejected this argument,
and began its analysis by examining the plain language of
CERCLA.' Under the statute, hazardous substance is broadly de-
fined as any substance so designated by the EPA pursuant to
Section 9602,2 or by any of fopr other environmental statutes.43
34. Id. CERCLA created the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and it is implemented
by the EPA as a means of prioritizing the hazardous waste sites throughout the nation.
Id.
35. rd.
36. Id. at 1198-99.
37. Id. at 1198 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)). The court also noted that the plain
language of the section clearly showed an abrogation of sovereign immunity for munici-
palities. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1199-1206. Since release or threatened release of a hazardous substance was
not in dispute, the court's discussion focused solely on whether MSW is a hazardous sub-
stance.
40. Id. at 1200.
41. Id. at 1199.
42. The EPA has listed over 700 hazardous substances. Id. at 1200 (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 302 (tbl. 302.4)).
43. rd. at 1199-2000 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)). Section 9601(14) states,
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant
to section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any
hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to
section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. . . , (D) any toxic pollutant
listed under section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act ... .and (F) any imminently hazard-
ous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has
taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 15. The term does not include
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In order to qualify as hazardous under CERCLA, a substance need
only be designated as such under one of above the statutory op-
tions." Although the statute specifically exempts natural gas and
oil from its definition of hazardous substance, no other such ex-
emptions were made.45 Therefore, the court concluded that
CERCLA's silence on the issue of MSW does not support the
conclusion that it should be excluded from the definition of hazard-
ous substance.
In addition, CERCLA makes no distinction among PRPs or
with respect to the source of the hazardous substance.47 Further-
more, neither quantity nor concentration are relevant factors in
determining whether a substance is hazardous.' Finally, the court
noted that the term "municipal solid waste" need not be listed
specifically by its name, rather than by its constituent components,
to fall within the definition of hazardous substance.49 CERCLA
liability depends solely upon the presence, in any form, of hazard-
ous substances. 0 Therefore, if a municipality arranges for the dis-
posal or treatment of waste containing any substances that are
designated as hazardous under the statute, the municipality may be
liable for either response costs or contribution if a subsequent
release or threatened release occurs.51
The municipalities also argued that Congress intended to ex-
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs
(A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas,
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or
mixture of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
44. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1200.
45. See supra note 48.
46. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1201; see also Transportation Leasing Co. v. Califor-
nia, No. 89-7368WMB, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20,734 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1991) (reject-
ing the defendant municipalities' argument the CERCLA definition of hazardous substance
excludes hazardous waste and denying the municipalities' motion for summary judgment).
Transportation Leasing Co. was a CERCLA contribution action brought by 64 industrial
parties against, among others, 29 municipal defendants.
47. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1200.
48. Id. (stating that the concentration of hazardous substances in MSW is therefore not
relevant in determining whether liability under CERCLA is triggered). The court acknowl-
edged that notwithstanding its tremendous volume, household waste contains very low
concentrations of hazardous substances. However, despite this low concentration, the clean-
up costs of landfills containing MSW may be greater than those encountered at other sites
due to the greater volume and lower toxicity. Id. at 1197.
49. Id. at 1201.
50. Id.
51. Id.
1100 [Vol. 44.1093
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elude MSW from the CERCLA definition of hazardous substance
through the incorporation of the exemption for household hazardous
waste found in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). The court rejected this argument as well.s The court
stated that the narrow RCRA household waste exemption does not
limit the CERCLA definition of hazardous substance In addi-
tion, the court noted that interpreting this exemption to apply to
CERCLA would frustrate CERCLA's broad remedial goals as well
as unjustifiably extend the scope of RCRA's regulations55 The
court reasoned that, even though the environmental risks posed by
household waste do not require the most stringent regulation of its
day-to-day management, this does not mean that the damage
caused when these risks materialize is not sufficient to impose
liability on those responsible for the harm.5
52. Id. at 1200-01. The municipalities contended that the exemption for household
hazardous waste in the RCRA regulations was intended to be incorporated, through
CERCLA § 9601(14)(C), into the CERCLA definition of hazardous substance. Id. at 1203;
see also supra note 48 (quoting § 9601(14)(C)).
53. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1201-03. The primary purpose of RCRA is to regulate
current treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes. Id. at 1201. Under
RCRA, the EPA promulgated two separate regulatory systems concerning the transportation
of waste and the operation of waste storage and disposal facilities: one for solid wastes
and the other for hazardous wastes. Id. (citing Subpart D of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-
49a and Subpart C of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39b, respectively). Of the two types of
wastes, hazardous wastes are regulated more stringently. Id. Hazardous wastes are listed in
40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-33. Id. In the regulations that identified and listed hazardous wastes
that are subject to RCRA Subtitle C regulations, the EPA excluded certain solid wastes
from the definition of hazardous wastes, for regulatory purposes, despite the fact that
these wastes might otherwise be considered hazardous. Id. (citing Notification of Treat-
ment, Storage and Disposal Facilities, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,144, 22,145 (1981)). Pursuant to
congressional plan, the EPA included household wastes among those solid wastes excluded
from the RCRA Subpart C hazardous waste regulations. Id. The household waste exclu-
sion was promulgated by the EPA pursuant to a congressional intent that such waste
should not be subject to the same stringent standards with regard to its everyday transpor-
tation, storage, and disposal, and that certain waste streams were to be excluded from
RCRA regulation. Id.
54. Id. at 1202. The EPA itself expressly acknowledged the limited scope of the ex-
emption by stating that those solid wastes exempted were wastes that might otherwise be
considered hazardous. Id. (citing 46 Fed.Reg. 22,144, 22,145 (1981)). In addition, the
court stressed the distinction between wastes, to which RCRA applies, and substances, to
which CERCLA applies. The RCRA exemption applies to household wastes; CERCLA,
however, is concerned with hazardous substances. Id. RCRA regulations depend, in part,
upon threshold quantity or concentration requirements. Such factors are irrelevant in defin-
ing hazardous substances under CERCLA, and to incorporate these considerations into
CERCLA would be inconsistent with the statute, which imposes liability without regard to
the amount of a hazardous substance present. Id.
55. Id. at 1202. "RCRA is preventative; CERCLA is curative.' Id.
56. Id. The municipalities asserted a third argument, based on the notification require-
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Next, relying mainly on the Environmental Protection
Agency's Interim Municipal Settlement Policy,' the municipalities
argued that the EPA itself interprets CERCLA to impose no liabili-
ty on municipalities that arrange for the disposal of MSW 8 They
asserted that the EPA, by virtue of its policy, created a rebuttable
presumption that the generation and transportation of MSW would
not trigger CERCLA liability5 9 The court, however, did not agree
with the way in which the municipalities characterized the EPA's
interpretation of CERCLA, and noted that the EPA does in fact
interpret CERCLA to impose liability on municipalities that arrange
for disposal of MSW.' The court explained that the EPA's Inter-
im Municipal Settlement Policy was designed to guide the agency's
regional offices in exercising their enforcement discretion.6 The
Settlement Policy simply indicates that the EPA does not currently
intend to commence enforcement actions against municipalities that
generate or transport MSW.' Moreover, the Settlement Policy
expressly provides that it does not affect any party's potential
liability under CERCLA, and that it does not preclude a third party
from commencing a contribution suit!3
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had established a prima
facie case of liability under CERCLA, and affirmed the district
court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment"
ments of § 9603(c). However, the court dismissed this argument as well, explaining that
the EPA's exemption of household wastes from CERCLA notification requirements does
not mean that disparate treatment of MSW under the liability provisions of the statute is
warranted. Id. at 1203.
57. See supra note 2.
58. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1205.
59. Id.
60. Id. (commenting that the municipalities' characterization of the EPA's interpretation
was "more wish than reality").
61. Id. (citing 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,071). The court reasoned that policies regarding en-
forcement discretion, which inherently reflect various administrative constraints, do not
necessarily mirror the CERCLA liability scheme. Id. at 1205. The EPA is permitted to
selectively prosecute only the major contributors to a hazardous site, and it typically pros-
ecutes the largest contributors or those most able to pay cleanup costs, leaving such par-
ties to seek contribution from other liable parties. Id.
62. Id. at 1205. However, the EPA will pursue municipalities if the total privately
generated commercial hazardous substances are insignificant in comparison to the MSW.
Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, supra note 2, at 51,072.
63. Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, supra note 2, at 51,071. In addition, the Set-
tlement Policy also states that CERCLA does not provide an exemption from liability for
MSW. Id. at 51,074. The court concluded that the EPA does not interpret CERCLA to
exempt MSW. B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1206.
64. Id. at 1206. The court summarized its holding by stating that the plain meaning of
[Vol. 44:1093
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In its final analysis, the court acknowledged that holding munici-
palities as responsible parties under CERCLA and including MSW
within the statute's definition of hazardous substances will have
"far reaching implications for municipalities and their taxpayers."'
The remainder of this Note focuses on these "far reaching implica-
tions" and proposes a system to ease the municipal liability burden.
Ill. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MuNICIPAL LABIY
A. The Land Mine Explodes: A Look Beyond B.F. Goodrich
The implications of B.F. Goodrich extend far beyond its hold-
ing that municipalities are subject to CERCLA liability for the
disposal of MSW. Although the current EPA policy is to refrain
from commencing enforcement actions against municipalities, the
Settlement Policy explicitly states that it does not preclude a third
party from commencing a contribution suit against a municipali-
ty. Consequently, responsible parties in CERCLA suits now can
sue municipalities. The EPA has identified 320 sites that involve
municipalities or MSW.' Given the tremendous volume of
MSW 8 and the presumable ability of municipalities to spread the
costs of cleanup among their taxpayers, the consequences are clear.
Municipalities across the nation will routinely become the target of
contribution actions initiated by responsible parties, and municipali-
CERCLA, its stated objectives, the absence of a clear congressional aim to the contrary,
and the unambiguous EPA Settlement Policy all supported the conclusion that municipal
defendants are responsible parties under CERCLA, and that the CERCLA definition of
hazardous substance includes MSW, if the MSW contains any amount of a hazardous
substance, as defined pursuant to any of the subsections of § 9601(14). Id. The court
noted that CERCLA grants courts the authority to "allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)). Such equitable factors include allocation of costs based on the rela-
tive volume and toxicity of the substances for which the municipalities arranged for dis-
posal, the relative cleanup costs incurred as a result of these wastes, the degree of care
exhibited by each party with respect to the hazardous substances, and the financial re-
sources of the parties involved. Id.
In a subsequent decision, B.F. Goodrich, Co. v. Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn.
1993), the court granted the municipalities' motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the defendant corporations bad failed to prove that the MSW the municipalities dis-
posed of contained specific hazardous substances.
65. B. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1206.
66. See Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, supra note 2, at 51,071.
67. Id (stating that these 320 sites comprise approximately 25% of the sites on the
NPL, and 236 of them are municipal landfills).
68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ties will routinely be required to contribute to the costs of cleaning
up the sites at which they disposed of MSW.69
B. The Inherent Inequities Of Municipal Liability
Throwing garbage away is a concept familiar to all; indeed,
we are a "throw away" society. Regardless of where one resides or
the amount of garbage one throws away, everyone has contributed
to problems created by the disposal of MSW. One of the greatest
problems inherent in the notion of municipal liability is that it is a
selective solution7 to a comprehensive, nationwide dilemma. We
have all contributed to the damage caused by the disposal of
MSW, yet, under the current system, not everyone will contribute
to the costs of cleaning up the mess.
1. A Tale of Two Cities: One Rich, One Poor
States have traditionally authorized municipalities to provide
residents with essential public services, such as sanitation.7!' In
order to finance these services, municipalities assess local property
taxes.Y Municipalities are unequal by nature.: They vary tremen-
dously in terms of both size and public service needs!' In addi-
69. Industrial PRPs have already filed several third party lawsuits involving liability for
MSW at sites across the nation. Rena L Steinzor & Matthew F. Lintner, Should Taxpay-
ers Pay the Cost of Superfund?, 22 ENvSL. L. REP. 10089, 10089 (1992). Such suits
have arisen in California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania. Id. at n.8.
70. The concept of municipal liability for the disposal of MSW is not, itself, selective;
all municipalities are potentially liable. However, the way in which it will be implement-
ed, primarily through contribution actions, will arguably be inconsistent and arbitrary, and
will depend upon several factors. Such factors include the ability and willingness of re-
sponsible parties to initiate contribution suits and the number and location of sites con-
mining MSW that are scheduled for remediation, i.e., the sites that are on the NPL.
71. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government
Laiv, 90 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 19 (1990); see also Donna R. Lanza, Municipal Solid Waste
Regulation: An Ineffective Solution to a National Problem, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.I. 215,
218 (1982) (noting that the collection and disposal of solid waste is an essential and
traditional governmental function and it is generally performed by municipalities).
72. Id. Property taxes often do not raise enough revenues. See Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. RrV. 346, 350 (1990).
Therefore, many states have granted cities the power to tax incomes and sales, as well as
property. Id.
73. See Briffault, supra note 71, at 114 (noting that some municipalities have substan-
tial resources and few needs, while others have significant needs, but are relatively poor).
Furthermore, the extent of local needs is often completely unrelated to the availability of
local resources. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 19-20 (explaining that some municipalities, especially large cities, have much
greater public safety, public health, and public assistance needs that divert municipal rave-
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tion, local settlement patterns reflect differences in race, class, and
wealth,75 and these patterns foster the separation of taxable wealth
from public service needs. 6 Since municipal budgets rely primari-
ly on the local tax base, wealth differences among municipalities
create marked differences in the quality of services that the munici-
pality can provide.
While wealthy municipalities have more revenues to devote to
public services, such as waste disposal, poorer municipalities have
less revenues available to furnish such services. Municipal liability
under CERCLA does not distinguish between wealthy and poor
municipalities: all are potentially liable. However, poorer municipal-
ities may suffer the greatest financial burdens for environmental
cleanup costs. Since poorer municipalities have limited financial
resources, they may have been unable, due to budgetary con-
straints, or unwilling, due to more pressing public needs,7 to
adopt adequate disposal precautions from the outset.79
In addition, more densely populated municipalities, such as
cities, tend to be poor' The EPA's hazardous site ranking system
uses population as a relevant factor in determining which hazardous
waste sites will be scheduled for cleanup, with more heavily popu-
lated areas receiving priority.8!' Therefore, once again, it is more
nues from other necessary services).
75. Id. at 5.
76. Idl; see also Briffault, supra not 72, at 437. The fact that municipalities are seg-
regated by race, class, and function has clear consequences for local public services. Id
The separation of the rich from the poor and of businesses from residences results in a
separation of taxable wealth from public service needs. Id.
77. Briffault, supra note 72, at 437-38. Municipalities are "all too likely" to furnish
services to residents based on their wealth and race. Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and
Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services, 100 HARV. L. REV. 946, 952 (1987) (book
review).
78. We have only recently learned that the disposal of everyday household garbage can
damage the environment. Therefore, years ago, poorer municipalities faced with budgetary
constraints most likely directed their spending towards "more important' public services,
such as education, health, and safety. The simple solution to the disposal of residents'
garbage was most likely hauling it away to a local dump and forgetting about it.
79. See Briffault, supra note 72, at 424 (commenting that local regulatory decisions are
"profoundly affected" by local fiscal capacity); see also id. at 423 (noting that studies
have revealed that the quantity and quality of local services varies directly with local
fiscal capacity).
80. See Briffault, supra note 72, at 349 (stating that many big cities have large social
welfare and infrastructure demands). These cities must deal with problems such as "pover-
ty, unemployment, dependent populations, crime, drug addiction, deteriorating housing and
crumbling roads, bridges, and mass transit, even as many of them are in economic de-
cline." Id. at 350 n.26.
81. Hazardous Sites in Poor, Rural Counties Receive Less Attention than Other U.S.
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likely that municipal liability under CERCLA will hit poorer mu-
nicipalities the hardest. Assuming this argument to be true, poorer
municipalities will be required to contribute more money and more
often to environmental cleanups, and this will serve to perpetuate
both social and economic inequalities.
2. The Tax Man Cometh, But Where Will He Go?
As the court in B.F. Goodrich acknowledged, municipal liabil-
ity under CERCLA will have "far reaching implications for munici-
palities and their taxpayers.""2 CERCLA cleanup costs are ex-
tremely high,"3 and pose a devastating threat to municipalities 4
Municipalities responsible for cleanup costs will most likely finance
their liability primarily via increased property taxes, with the
burden falling directly on their residents. There are two ways in
which municipalities might respond to the threat of CERCLA lia-
bility.
First, a municipality might gradually raise property taxes and
create its own CERCLA reserve fund. 6 In such a situation, the
Sites, 20 ENV'T REP. April 13, 1990, at 1961.
82. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. The EPA estimates that the average cost of cleaning up a contaminated site ranges
from $25 million to $30 million, excluding transaction costs. John Godfrey, Superfund
Revenue Mix Under Review, 50 TAX Nom s 819, 819 (1991); see also Steinzor &
Lintner, supra note 69, at 10,090 (noting that if cleanup costs are allocated by volume,
municipalities that contributed only MSW to a site could be required to pay up to 90%
of the remediation costs for that particular site). In 1992, the EPA attempted to formulate
a municipal cleanup cost allocation policy. See 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2333 (Feb. 7,
1992). According to the EPA, the purpose of this new policy would be to develop a cost
allocation scheme and a model municipal settlement document to protect municipalities
from third party contribution actions. 22 ENV'T REP. 1368 (Sept. 27, 1991); see also
David B. Van Slyke, Municipalities and CERCLA: The Cleanup Cost Allocation Conun-
drum, 5 VILL. ENVrm- LJ. 53 (1994) (discussing other liability allocation formulas consid-
ered by EPA). However, municipalities may encounter state or local restrictions in at-
tempting to settle.
84. There are 39,000 local government entities;, over three quarters of these have less
than 3,000 residents, and more than one-half of these have less than 1,000. Ferrey, supra
note 2, at 273. Given the extremely high costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites, the
impact on smaller municipalities, such as those with fewer than 1,000 residents, will be
crippling both to the municipalities and their residents due to the smaller tax base over
which the costs can be spread. CERCLA liability costs "can easily bring municipal gov-
ernments to their knees:' Robert G. Torricelli, Municipal Liability Under Superfund - A
Legislative Response, 16 SEON HALL LEGIS. J. 491, 497 (1992).
85. See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 274.
86. This might occur when a municipality is aware that a site at which it disposed of
its MSW is on the NPL and is scheduled for remediation. However, it should be noted
that this option might not be readily available to all municipalities. Many state constitu-
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residents of the municipality will by paying higher taxes in antici-
pation of future liability. Such liability may or may not materialize.
If the municipality is found liable, and consequently must contrib-
ute to cleanup costs, this increased tax (the municipal reserve fund)
will have served its purpose. However, if the municipality is not
required to contribute to cleanup costs," the increased tax will
have been unnecessary," and will have tied up revenue, diverting
it from other, more productive uses. 9
Second, a municipality might do nothing until it is actually
found liable and required to contribute to cleanup costs. In this
situation, if the municipality is found liable, the tremendous costs
of liability will have to be raised quickly. This could result in one
large tax increase, as opposed to gradual increases, for residents.
Since everyone has contributed to the damage caused by
MSW, individual municipal liability, financed primarily by property
tax increases, creates several inequities. First, residents of munici-
palities will be subject to increased taxes for environmental damag-
es based solely on where they reside. If the problems created by
MSW transcend municipal boundaries,' then a system of paying
the costs of environmental cleanup based solely on one's place of
residence is fundamentally inequitable 9 '
tions contain provisions that restrict the taxing power of municipalities, especially with
regard to property taxes. Jerome G. Rose, Development Fees: To What Extent May Munic-
ipalities Shift the Costs of Public Improvements to New Developments?, 15 CURRENT
MUN. PROBLEMS 211, 215 (1988-89).
87. This might occur for two reasons. First, a third party contribution suit may never
be commenced against the municipality. Second, although the site is scheduled for
remediation, the EPA may never actually commence the cleanup, or it may postpone the
cleanup due to the site's "hazardous" ranking (priority) on the NPL in comparison to
other, more dangerous sites.
88. This, however, may not necessarily be true. MSW does contain hazardous substanc-
es, and consequently, any municipality which has arranged for the disposal of MSW is a
target for a contribution suit. Therefore, with respect to CERCLA liability, municipalities
are confronted with a Catch-22 situation. The fact that they can now be found liable, and
the relative ease with which this can occur seem to indicate that a municipality can never
be certain that it will not incur liability for cleanup costs in the future.
89. The revenues that the municipality set aside in anticipation of liability could have
been used to finance preventive environmental efforts such as waste management pro-
grams. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
90. MSW is disposed of by municipalities across the nation, yet the damage caused by
its hazardous components remains the same, regardless of the location of the site at which
it was disposed.
91. Arguably, a person's place of residence is largely determined by external forces.
Many factors influence where ones resides, especially economic factors such as proximity
to place of employment and the availability of affordable housing.
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Second, municipal waste disposal decisions are largely beyond
the control of the individual residents.2 Residents have no control
over the final destination of their garbage, but can only hope that
it was placed in a sanitary landfill. They entrust the responsibility
of proper disposal to their municipality. Municipal residents have
neither the means nor knowledge to ensure the proper disposal of
their waste; they pay for the municipality to handle the disposal.93
Furthermore, waste disposal is an essential public service?4 While
a private entity can choose not to operate a business that generates
hazardous waste, a municipality has no such choice.95 Therefore,
municipal residents face enormous potential CERCLA liability for
which their elected officials have no alternatives." Finally, while
it may be argued that the reason a municipality incurs the costs of
CERCLA liability is because of the garbage its residents disposed
of, even those who have recently moved to a municipality will be
required to pay for the environmental damage caused by residents
of that municipality prior to their arrival.
IV. RECENTLY PROPOSED SOLUIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS
CREATED BY MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
It is beyond dispute that municipalities are now subject to
92. The degree of municipal involvement in the MSW disposal process ranges from
situations in which the municipality contracts away its disposal responsibility to companies
in the private sector, to situations in which the municipality retains complete control over
the disposal process. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 240-41. There are basically four ways in
which a municipality may handle the waste disposal process. They may (1) directly col-
lect and transport MSW to disposal facilities; (2) collect MSW from residents, transport it
to a transfer station, and contract with private companies to carry it to a disposal facility,
(3) contract with private companies for both collection and transport; or (4) provide no
collection or transport services at all, requiring residents to dispose of garbage themselves.
Id. at 233.
93. Most households either have the costs of waste disposal included in their local
property taxes, or pay a fee to private collectors. Terry Dinan, Solid Waste: Incentives
that Could Lighten the Load, EPA J., May-June, 1992, at 12, 13.
94. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
95. Hon. James J. Florio et al., Too-Strict Liability: Making Local Government Entities
Pay for Waste Disposal Site Cleanup, 1 Vi. ENv'ri.. L. 105, 121 (1990).
96. Id. This may not necessarily be true. Arguably, if former elected officials had
taken adequate disposal precautions from the outset, they would not currently be threat-
ened with CERCLA liability. However, it was just recently determined that MSW contains
hazardous substances. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. Therefore, former offi-
cials were most likely not aware of the need to take such precautions. Furthermore, even
if they had been, other factors such as fiscal constraints might have precluded the adop-
tion of precautionary measures. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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CERCLA liability for arranging the disposal of MSWV and that
CERCLA liability will have a tremendous impact on municipalities
and their residents.98 However, there is much debate over what
should be done to ease this liability burden. The following analysis
focuses on some of the more recently proposed solutions to the
problem, and argues that each is fundamentally flawed.
A. Congressional Response To Municipal Liability: The Toxic
Cleanup Equity And Acceleration Act Of 1991'
In 1991, the Toxic Cleanup and Equity Acceleration Act
(TCEAA) was introduced, and defeated, in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives."® The purpose of the TCEAA was to
amend CERCLA to protect citizens, municipalities, and other gen-
erators and transporters of MSW and sewage sludge 0' from law-
suits that treat these substances in the same manner as industrial
97. See supra part I.
98. See supra part Ill.
99. S. 1557, 102d Cong., 1st Seass. (1991) [hereinafter S. 1557]; HR. 3026, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter H.R. 3026]. A similar, yet less detailed bill was also
introduced into the House and defeated in 1991. It was entitled the Toxic Pollution
Responsibility Act of 1991, and was sponsored by Representatives Smith, Dreier, and
Saxton. H.R. 2767, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The purpose of this bill was simply to
amend CERCLA so that municipalities would not be liable for the generation or
transportation of MSW. Id.
Since the defeat of the TCEAA, several additional bills have been introduced and
defeated in Congress. See, e.g., The Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993,
HR. 870, 103d Cong., 1st Seass. (1993); S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Seass. (1993) (proposing
to amend CERCLA to shield municipalities from contribution actions, capping the
aggregate amount of damages that all municipalities at a given site would be liable for as
a result of settlement agreements with the EPA, and providing for "in-kind services" in
lieu of cash payments for municipalities unable to finance their share of liability). For a
more detailed discussion of The Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993 and
other recent congressional proposals, see Joseph M. Manko & Madeleine H. Cozine, The
Battle Over Municipal Liability Under CERCLA Heats Up: An Analysis of Proposed
Congressional Amendments to Superfind, 5 Viu.. ENVTh. LJ. 23 (1994). Since all of the
congressional proposals espouse essentially the same goal of eliminating or severely
restricting municipal liability under CERCLA, only the TCEAA of 1991 will be referred
to in the following discussion to serve as an illustration of the flawed reasoning
underlying each of them.
100. Virtually the same bill was simultaneously introduced into both the House and the
Senate. H.R. 3026 was sponsored by Representatives Torricelli, Dreier, Atkins, Gallo,
Hunter, Martinez, Moorhead, Shays, Skaggs, Torres, and Weldon. H.R. 3026, supra note
99. S. 1557 was sponsored by Senators Lautenberg and Wirth. S. 1557, supra note 99. A
revised version of S. 1557 was incorporated into a bill entitled the Federal Housing Regu-
latory Reform Act, and was introduced into the Senate in 1992. See S. 2733, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992). This proposal was also defeated. Id.
101. Although the bills addressed both MSW and sewage sludge, for purposes of this
discussion, references to sewage sludge will be omitted.
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hazardous waste."0 2 The House version of the bill began by not-
ing "several congressional findings.' 3 Included among these find-
ings were (1) that there was a need for a reaffirmation of the
policies underlying CERCLA, including the principle that the pol-
luter should pay for cleanup, (2) that Congress did not intend to
hold municipalities strictly, jointly, and severally liable under
CERCLA for the generation or transportation of MSW, and (3) that
third party contribution suits premised on the generation or trans-
portation of MSW distort the intent of CERCLA and delay clean-
ups.
10 4
Based on these findings, the TCEAA proposed significant
modifications to CERCLA.05 First, it would have added a defini-
tion of MSW to CERCLA Section 1012.' Second, it would have
eliminated third party contribution suits related to the generation,
transportation, or disposal of MSW.t  Third, the TCEAA would
have codified the Interim Municipal Settlement Policy,"' by pro-
viding that the EPA would not initiate Section 9606 enforcement
actions against municipalities for the generation, transportation, or
disposal of MSW, unless "truly exceptional" circumstances exist-
ed." In addition, it would have provided for expedited settle-
ments for municipalities against whom enforcement actions were
initiated,' and would have permitted the formation of covenants
102. S. 1557 & H.R. 3026, supra note 99.
103. See H.R. 3026, supra note 99.
104. ILa
105. S. 1557 & H.R. 3026, supra note 99.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 2.
109. S. 1557 & H.R. 3026, supra note 99. The bills stated that truly exceptional cir-
cumstances would exist when (I) there was site-specific evidence that the hazardous sub-
stances involved are not substances typically present in MSW, and were derived from a
commercial, institutional, or industrial process or activity, (2) both the volume and toxicity
of the MSW present at the site significantly outweighed the aggregate presence of hazard-
ous substances from other sources, or (3) absent the aggregate contribution of hazardous
substances from other sources, the hazardous substances contained in the MSW would be
a significant cause of the release or threatened release creating the need for a response
action. Id.
110. Id. Such settlements would require municipalities to pay for cleanup costs based on
the quantity of hazardous substances present in the MSW, as opposed to payment based
on the volume of MSW present at the site, and would limit municipal payments if such
payments would force the municipality into bankruptcy or cause it to default on its debt
obligations. Id. In addition, municipalities would be encouraged to enter into settlements
that would permit them to contribute services instead of money, or to make delayed pay-
ments. Id. However, local or state laws may hinder a municipality's ability to participate
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not to sue municipalities with respect to sites for which they had
entered into settlements."'
Throughout the Congressional Records that pertain to the
introduction of the TCEAA, there is one consistent concern: per-
mitting "very guilty" corporations to bring contribution suits against
"less guilty" municipalities frustrates the "polluter, not the taxpayer,
pays" principle underlying CERCLA."2 Indeed, the congressional
findings referred to earlier specifically expressed a need to reaffmn
this principle."' However, the notion that municipalities are less
guilty than corporations seems more convenient than accurate." 4
While the compositions of industrial waste and MSW differ, it
cannot be denied that MSW does in fact contain hazardous sub-
stances,"5 and therefore, creates the same demand for cleanup as
does waste from any other source." 6
Moreover, while Congress is correct to give great weight to
the "polluter pays" principle, in the context of municipal liability,
it has failed to identify the polluter. Here, the polluter is the tax-
payer. By effectively barring third party contribution actions, a
proposal such as the TCEAA would directly contradict the polluter
pays principle, because it would, in most cases, shield the polluter
in a settlement by imposing practical or legal constraints. See Steinzor & Lininer, supra
note 10, at 131-35 (discussing potential restrictions on a municipality's ability to settle).
111. S. 1557 & H.R. 3026, supra note 99.
112. See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. 10,952 (statement of Senator Lautenberg) (commenting
that the TCEAA was designed "to block opportunistic and costly lawsuits by large corpo-
rate polluters against such innocent entities as ... America's local governments").
113. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
114. "At the heart of the effort to exempt municipalities from Superfund liability are
two stubborn fallacies. The first is that 'ordinary garbage' is benign, and the second is
that all industrial wastes are harmful." Andrew A. Giaccia & Roy S. Belden, Why Munici-
palities Should Not Receive Special Treatment Under Superfnd, 22 ENrn. L. REP.
10431, 10431 (1992).
115. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (explaining that while MSW does
contain smaller concentrations of hazardous substances than waste from other sources, the
tremendous volume of MSW produces large quantities of potentially toxic substances); see
also Giaccia & Belden, supra note 114, at 10431 (stating that even a low percentage of
high volume MSW can produce a large total quantity of hazardous substances); note 48
and accompanying text (commenting that despite the low concentrations of hazardous sub-
stances in MSW, the cleanup costs of sites containing MSW may be greater than those at
other sites). Furthermore, due to its volume, MSW may increase the height and width of
the area that requires remediation at a hazardous waste site. Jeffrey N. Martin, Superfund
Liability for Municipal Waste, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 6, 9 (1991).
116. MSW contains significant amounts of hazardous substances and therefore contrib-
utes to site contamination. Giaccia & Belden, supra note 114, at 10432. "There is nothing
magical about the fact that such contamination comes from consumers instead of industrial
sources. The impact on the environment is identical." rd.
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from having to pay. It would also negate any deterrent effect that
might otherwise serve to shape current municipal disposal practices.
Finally, assuming that the overall goal of environmental legislation
is to clean up the environment, a measure that eliminates liability
where the responsible parties, municipalities, and their residents can
clearly be identified, directly frustrates this goal and should not be
accepted as a viable solution."7 Protecting municipalities from
liability merely shifts the burden of responsibility to others. How-
ever, adherence to the polluter pays principle dictates that this is a
burden that the residents of municipalities (taxpayers) should prop-
erly bear.
B. Other Recent Proposals
While all seem to agree that something must be done to solve
the problems created by municipal liability under CERCLA, there
is considerable disagreement with respect to exactly what this
might be. In response to the ongoing dilemma, some have argued
that municipalities should not be required to bear the burden of
environmental liability under the current statutory scheme, and that
the allocation of any municipal liability should be altered both to
contemplate the unique situation of municipalities and to ease the
liability burden."8 Others, however, support retention of the cur-
rent liability standard, and maintain that municipalities should con-
tribute to the costs of environmental clean-ups in the same manner
in which other responsible parties do."9 While each proposal has
its merits, the following analysis will illustrate that none of them
fully embody the comprehensive solution necessary to solve the
problem."
Some advocate altering the current scheme of liability 'alloca-
tion in order to ease the burden on municipalities; they have posit-
ed several methods by which this can be achieved.'' Suggested
117. While one of the congressional findings was that Congress did not intend to hold
municipalities liable under CERCLA for the generation or transportation of MSW, Con-
gress expressed no such intention in the statute. In fact, there are several indications that
Congress did intend for municipalities to be subject to CERCLA liability. See supra part
11.
118. See supra note 13.
119. See supra note 14.
120. The analysis that follows focuses on a mere sampling of the more recent proposals
in order to highlight the complexity of the problem and illustrate the need for a compre-
hensive solution.
121. See supra note 13.
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modifications include crediting municipalities for waste
minimization efforts or for handling MSW on a non-profit ba-
sis,'" allocating only certain cleanup costs to municipalities," 3
exempting municipalities from financing "orphan shares" of cleanup
costs that result from the joint liability scheme, 4 exempting mu-
nicipalities from liability under certain circumstances,"r and using
equitable mitigating factors when allocating cleanup costs among
parties.'
The difficulty with these solutions is that they focus primarily
on the present, and are intended to reduce the costs that a munici-
pality incurs as a result of CERCLA liability. First, while munici-
pal liability is unquestionably a problem that presently plagues
municipalities, it is by no means a temporary problem and there
are no indications that it will soon disappear. The environmental
damage to which MSW contributes will only be abated and elimi-
nated by specific efforts to alter current disposal practices. This
requires a waste reduction strategy for the future. Consequently,
any solution that focuses primarily on the present only begins to
address the problem.
Second, and perhaps more important, a solution predicated on
reducing contributions to cleanup efforts only inhibits individual
cleanups, and effectively thwarts the overall objective of cleaning
up the environment. Since residents of all municipalities have con-
tributed to the damage caused by MSW, and since municipal liabil-
ity is a local problem that has created a nationwide dilemma, it
seems appropriate to consider a national solution.
By approaching the problem from a national perspective, and
by requiring residents of all municipalities to contribute to the
costs of cleaning up the damage caused by MSW, regardless of
where they reside and regardless of where the damage may current-
122. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 2, at 276.
123. See, e.g., id.
124. See, e.g., id.
125. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 13, at 607-08.
126. It has been argued that when allocating costs, courts should utilize the equitable
factors included in the unsuccessful Gore Amendment to CERCLA. These factors include
(1) the ability of a PRP to show that its contribution to the site was distinguishable from
other PRPs, (2) the amount of hazardous substances that the PRP contributed to the site,
(3) the degree of toxicity of these substances, (4) the degree of the PRP's involvement
with the hazardous substances, (5) the degree of care exercised with regard to the hazard-
ous substances, and (6) the degree of a PRP's willingness to prevent public harm.
Meegan, supra note 13, at 1799 (citing 126 CoNG. REC. 26,781 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Gore)).
111319951
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ly be manifesting itself, the concept of municipal liability suddenly
becomes less intimidating, and the consequences of municipal lia-
bility become more equitable. Therefore, the solution should not
focus on reducing the liability of individual municipalities. Rather,
it should concentrate on combining the resources of the residents
of all municipalities, and should take advantage of the tremendous
opportunity to spread the costs of cleanup among all who have
contributed to the problem.
While some assert that the current liability scheme should be
altered,'27 one commentator has argued that it should be main-
tained.'" He maintains that this is the only way municipalities
will be motivated to consider disposal alternatives other than
landfilling, and suggests that municipalities combat CERCLA liabil-
ity by changing current waste disposal practices.'" Unlike other
proposed solutions, this one recognizes the need for planning for
the future. In this respect, it is correct. However, CERCLA liability
does not look forward; it remedies the consequences of the past.
Therefore, because this proposal fails to provide municipalities with
any assistance in dealing with their present liability due to their
past disposal practices, it is not an adequate solution.
The problems created by municipal liability under CERCLA
are extensive, and solutions that address only the present or the
future are necessarily incomplete. Municipal liability requires a
comprehensive solution that establishes both a method of easing the
present liability burden and a system that provides for the future
by altering current disposal practices. The proposal that follows
illustrates how this might be achieved.
V. MAKING MUNICIPAL LIABILrrY WORK
A. Taking Responsibility
I have a story. It is the story of a man who lived in the
world and to him the world looked one way for a long
time and then it looked another and very different way.
The change did not happen all at once. Many things hap-
pened, and that man did not know when he had any re-
127. See supra, note 13.
128. See Dupont, supra note 14, § IV.
129. Id. at 1201-02 (commenting that this may be achieved through source reduction,
recycling, and composting).
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sponsibility for them and when he did not. There was, in
fact, a time when he came to believe that nobody had any
responsibility for anything ... 
Although many years have passed since the above
words were written, the story seems especially relevant to
the problem of environmental liability. The issue of respon-
sibility is critical to any environmental solution; it is em-
bodied in the "polluter pays" principle underlying
CERCLA. However, municipal liability under CERCLA has
come to be viewed as a game of shifting responsibility,''
and the players have all taken their positions. The EPA has
explicitly declared that it will not pursue municipalities, yet
it has also asserted that it is permissible for third parties to
do so.' As a result, third parties are now successfully
taking advantage of their right to initiate contribution ac-
tions against municipalities, yet municipalities still maintain
that they should not be burdened with CERCLA liability.
Moreover, recent proposals are sympathetic to the plight of
municipalities and focus on reducing aggregate municipal
liability." If such proposals were to be adopted, they
would effectively shift the liability burden back to third
parties.
Properly viewed, contribution suits allow CERCLA
liability to be allocated and spread, not shifted, among
responsible parties.'34 By condemning the system as one
that permits some parties to take advantage of others, atten-
tion becomes too focused on who is trying or should be
130. ROBERT P. WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN 435 (1946).
131. This is reflected by the congressional concern that permitting corporations to bring
contribution suits against municipalities violates the "polluter pays" principle. See supra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text. However, with respect to contribution suits against
municipalities, liability is not being shifted from one party to another. Rather, it is being
spread more equitably among responsible parties, thus directly effectuating the "polluter
pays" principle.
132. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (explaining the EPA's Interim Mu-
nicipal Settlement Policy).
133. See supra notes 100-26 and accompanying text (discussing proposals that advocate
eliminating, or at least reducing municipal liability). But see notes 128-29 and accompany-
ing text (discussing a proposal that maintains that municipalities should face CERCLA
liability in the same way in which other responsible parties do).
134. See Steven B. Russo, Contribution Under CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA,
14 COLIJM. . ENVrL L. 267, 275 (commenting that the congressional purpose of the
CERCLA contribution provision was to encourage quicker, more equitable settlements and
to decrease litigation, thereby facilitating cleanups).
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able to avoid liability; the goal of cleaning up the environ-
ment gets lost in the process. At this point, adherence to
the notion of taking responsibility becomes crucial.'35 If
CERCLA is to be an effective tool for cleaning up the
environment, especially in the context of municipal liability,
it must be firmly committed to the concept of taking re-
sponsibility, and it must adhere to the "polluter pays" prin-
ciple from the outset, instead of merely relying on it as a
convenient means to justify the end.'35
Fortunately, the story quoted above does not remain the
same; our throw-away society appears to be changing.
While convenience is still important to Americans, the
environment is also becoming more and more important.
People are beginning to understand that their actions affect
the environment, and that, both individually and collective-
ly, they can become part of the solution. Public surveys
continuously indicate that society ranks the management of
hazardous and toxic waste as one of the nation's highest
environmental priorities.'"' Moreover, a 1988 poll revealed
that the public is more concerned about proper waste dis-
posal than about police or fire protection or affordable
housing.' It seems apparent that society has become
willing to take responsibility for cleaning up the environ-
135. "Attempts to fix blame must be replaced by a sense of shared purpose among
those involved in the pollution question." Maurice R. Greenberg, Needed: A Fee on Com-
mercial and Industrial Insurance to Finance Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 19 ENVTI. L.
REP. 10254, 10255 (1989).
136. The flawed reasoning underlying the TCEAA provides an illustration. According to
proponents of the TCEAA, (1) the polluter should pay, (2) the polluter is industry, not
the taxpayer, and therefore (3) industry should pay. On the first count, they are correct:
the polluter should pay. The fundamental flaw is that they incorrectly identified the pollut-
er. In the context of municipal liability, the taxpayer is the polluter. However, since the
goal of the TCEAA was to eliminate third party contribution actions against municipali-
ties, thereby forcing industry alone to shoulder the costs of cleanup, it was necessary to
justify this imposition of liability. Since environmental policy dictates that the polluter
should pay, the easiest way to do this is to delineate industry as the polluter. However,
accepting the fact that here, the taxpayer is the polluter, it becomes clear that designating
industry as the polluter was nothing more than a convenient means of achieving the goal
of the TCEAA. Adherence to "polluter pays" principle should entail identifying the pollut-
er and then imposing liability, rather than choosing those who "should" be liable, and
labelling them the polluter.
137. See Bill Roberts, Who Should Pay?, EPA J., July-Aug. 1991, at 33, 39.
138. Public Concern About Garbage Disposal Tops Police, Fire, Affordable Housing,
Poll Shows, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1247 (Oct. 28, 1988) (referring to a 1988
poll conducted by the National Solid Waste Management Association).
1116 [Vol. 44.1093
CLEANING UP THE MESS
ment. The solution, therefore, should begin by creating a
system through which they can.
B. Passing The Buck
Environmental cleanup is an extremely expensive en-
deavor, and someone must ultimately bear the burden.
Environmental policy dictates that the costs of cleanup are
properly borne by the polluter. In the context of municipal
liability under CERCLA, there is no question that the resi-
dents of municipalities are responsible for the generation of
MSW; they are the polluters. It follows that municipal
residents should pay the costs associated with the cleanup
of MSW' 39 However, the current CERCLA liability sys-
tem of individual municipal liability is inadequate to solve
the problems associated with the disposal of MSW.Y
These problems transcend the boundaries of individual
municipalities; we are in the midst of a national garbage
disposal crisis."' While the present allocation of munici-
pal liability under CERCLA may provide a way to clean
up the damage caused by past disposal of MSW, it produc-
es inherently inequitable results." Furthermore, the cur-
rent liability system does not encompass the national facet
of the garbage disposal problem because it fails to incorpo-
rate the need to alter current disposal practices on a nation-
al level.
While society may now be willing to take responsibility
for cleaning up the environment, it must first understand
what this entails. Environmental education and consumer
awareness are essential to this understanding. Until society
is made aware of the environmental damage caused by
current garbage disposal practices and the costs of cleaning
up this damage, it will not appreciate the effects of its
actions, and there will be little incentive to achieve the
necessary nationwide change in disposal practices.
139. See Meegan, supra note 13, at 1797-98 (stating that since municipalities dispose of
garbage for the benefit of their taxpayers, it is not unreasonable to require those taxpayers
to bear part of the liability burden).
140. See supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
141. 136 CONG. REC. H5501 (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Hochbrueckner).
142. See supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
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C. Municipal Liability Gets A Makeover
1. Superfund: The Current Federal Funding Scheme
When enacted, CERCLA established a $1.6 million
"Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund" 143
(Superfund) to enable the government to undertake immedi-
ate cleanups.1" Superfund was to be financed over a five-
year period, primarily through taxes on the domestic pro-
duction and import of chemical "feedstocks."'" s There are
two problems with Superfund. First, Superfund is inade-
quately funded and therefore cannot sufficiently provide for
current national cleanup needs."' Second, petroleum and
chemical "feedstocks" lead to hazardous waste generation
only indirectly and to differing degrees) 47 Consequently,
many companies which generate hazardous waste are not
currently contributing to Superfund.'"
143. CERCLA actually created two funds. First, there is the Post-Closure Liability Trust
Fund, which is funded by a tax on hazardous wastes received at qualified hazardous
waste disposal facilities and is used to finance cleanups at sites which have been closed
pursuant to CERCLA regulations. Second, there is the Hazardous Substance Response
Trust Fund (Superfund), which is used to finance all other remedial actions authorized by
CERCLA. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1472 n35.
144. See James J. Florio, Congress As Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in
the 1980's, 3 YALE J. REG. 351, 356 (1986) (explaining that the fund was to be used to
clean up sites that presented immediate threats to the public health and environment, and
for which judgments against private responsible parties could not be obtained). The EPA
may use Superfund dollars to undertake both short term "removal" actions and long term
"remedial" actions to respond to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances. See
David C. Clarke, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Approach,
58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1300, 1300 (1990). After it has undertaken remedial measures,
the EPA is permitted to sue responsible parties for cleanup costs and thereby replenish
Superftnd. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1472-73.
145. See Florio, supra note 144, at 355-56. Chemical "feedstocks" are the basic chemi-
cal building blocks used to manufacture most other chemical products. Id.; see also Toxic
Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1472 n.35 (noting that 87.5% of Superfund was derived
from taxes on petroleum and chemical "feedstocks," while the remaining 12.5% came
from general revenue appropriations). In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which reauthorized Superfund for another five
years by adding $8.6 billion to it. See Jack Lewis, Superfund, RCRA, and UST: The
Clean-up Threesome, EPA J., July-Aug. 1991, at 7, 9. Then, in 1990, Congress again
authorized continuing the program for an additional five years, adding another $5.1 billion
to it Id.
146. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1503.
147. See Roberta G. Gordon, Legal Incentives For Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A
New Approach to Hazardous Waste Management, 95 YALE L.J. 810, 812 (1986).
148. Id.
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2. Creation of Munfund
The Munfund proposal is designed to remedy the prob-
lems created by past disposal. It begins by establishing a
national municipal liability trust fund, the Munfund. The
creation of Munfund would radically alter the current sys-
tem of CERCLA liability for municipalities, as it would
effectively eliminate individual municipal liability. Munfund
would be used to finance all judgments against all munici-
palities that are found liable under CERCLA and thus
required to pay cleanup costs.
Munfund would be financed in the following manner.
First, it would require a slight alteration of Superfund. As
previously stated, 12.5% of Superfund is derived from
general appropriations.149 This money would be removed
from Superfund, and would form the basis of Munfund.
Given that Superfund is already inadequately funded to
effectuate its purpose," this would appear to be an un-
wise alteration. However, many companies that generate
hazardous waste do not currently contribute to
Superfund." Returning to the "polluter pays" principle, it
seems to follow that these companies should not be shield-
ed from contributing to Superfund." Therefore,
Superfund could be supplemented, and perhaps even
achieve more adequate funding, by altering its composition
to include contributions from all companies that generate
hazardous waste.
The remainder of Munfund 53 would be derived from
an additional appropriation from the federal income tax
base. 54 This would require either a federal tax increase,
149. See supra note 145.
150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
152. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1658 (commenting that the chemical
industry should not be forced to pay for all waste-generating activity).
153. The determination of the amount of money necessary to sustain Munfund is be-
yond the scope of this Note. It would require an extensive examination into such factors
as the number of hazardous waste sites containing MSW that are scheduled for immediate
and future remediation and the average amount of cleanup costs that liable municipalities
are required to pay.
154. See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 277 (commenting that "the placement of financial
responsibility on those who generate the hazardous substances, even when payment is
made from tax revenues . . . is the economically and legally correct demarcation point for
any discussion of waste policy").
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or a change in the current allocation of federal income tax
revenues, or perhaps both. Given the resistance of Ameri-
cans to tax increases, this might also seem like an unwise
modification. However, two recent polls indicate that Amer-
icans are willing to pay higher taxes to clean up the envi-
ronment." The use of appropriations from the federal in-
come tax base is also justifiable on the ground that the
damage caused by the disposal of MSW is a societal prob-
lem, and one that is not confined to individual municipali-
ties.56 However, if left to fend for themselves, municipal-
ities would face substantial difficulties in raising, and per-
haps even in collecting, the funds necessary to satisfy judg-
ments against them."
Two commentators have proposed several goals that an
environmental tax might be expected to achieve.' 8 First,
the tax must be administratively feasible."9 In terms of
implementation, the tax base (the individuals responsible for
paying the tax) should be readily identifiable and enforce-
ment should be relatively easy." ° Munfund would be sim-
ple to administer because the tax base is clearly identifi-
able. Furthermore, enforcement would not pose a problem
because the federal income tax system is already well es-
tablished. Therefore, collection of the money to finance
Munfund would be administratively feasible.
155. See Public Willing to Pay Higher Taxes for Cleaner Environment, Survey Says, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1780 (Feb. 16, 1990) (referring to a nationwide survey
conducted by the Cambridge Energy Research Associates and Opinion Dynamics Corp.,
which revealed that more than half of those polled were "definitely willing" to pay an
extra $50.00 per year to cleanup the environment); see also Poll Finds Americans Willing
to Pay Higher Taxes to Clean Up Environment, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1586
(Dec. 21, 1990) (referring to a Time Magazine-Cable News Network poll revealing that
70% of the respondents would be willing to pay $200 more in taxes per year to cleanup
the environment, while 44% of these respondents were even willing to pay $500 in higher
taxes for this purpose).
156. See Richard A. Westin, Environmental Taxes: Some Options, 48 TAX NOTES 355,
355 (1990) (noting that an important criteria of an environmental tax is that it be more
appropriate to use national, rather than regional, standards).
157. See supra part U.B.2 (discussing ways in which municipalities might raise the
money to finance CERCLA liability).
158. J. Lon Carlson & Charles W. Bausell, Jr., Financing Superfund: An Evaluation of
Alternative Tax Mechanisms, 27 NAT. REsoURCES J. 103 (1987). While these commenta-
tors discussed the seven factors in the context of generating revenues for a continued
Superfund, the factors seem equally applicable to the Munfund.
159. Id. at 108.
160. ld. at 109.
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The second goal is revenue generation, including the
stability of the revenue flow over time.'6' Munfund has
the potential to generate substantial revenues. Once the
amount of money necessary to sustain Munfund is deter-
mined, an appropriation from federal income tax revenues
can be made. This would require a tax increase or a
change in the current allocation of income tax revenues, or
both. Regardless of the manner in which tax revenues are
appropriated, however, Munfund will maintain its stability
because federal income taxes are collected on an annual ba-
sis. Furthermore, since Munfund is a broad-based tax, and
would only marginally affect those paying federal income
taxes, the stability of the tax base would not be threatened.
Third, the tax should be equitable.'62 In the context of
financing the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, there is no
clearly established or generally agreed upon result that is
"equitable."' 63 Some argue that equity is achieved by re-
quiring those whose past actions created the problem (gen-
erators) to pay to clean it up.' Others maintain that
those who have benefitted from less expensive disposal
practices in the past should pay.'6 Finally, some advocate
that equity will best be served by spreading the burden of
cleanup costs over as large a group as possible, since the
current problems were not foreseen at the time of dispos-
al166
In addition to the notions of equity discussed above,
public finance theory differentiates between two approaches
to equity in the context of tax incidence. 67 The benefits
principle dictates that an individual should pay an amount
of tax that reflects the benefit they will receive from the
public service the tax will fund.s The "ability to pay"
principle holds that individuals should pay taxes based on
161. Id. at 108-09.
162. rd. at 109.
163. See Carlson & Bausell, supra note 158, at 110.
164. Ild. This view is essentially the "polluter pays" principle, which is reflected in
current law.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 111.
168. See Carlson & Bausell, supra note 158, at 110.
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their income. 69
While the notions of equity vary, Munfund would
arguably come very close to achieving each of them. First,
Munfund would effectuate the "polluter pays" principle.
While all taxpayers may not have been "equal polluters,"
all have disposed of MSW and consequently have contrib-
uted to the resultant problems. Second, it is arguable that
municipal residents have benefitted from lax past disposal
practices due to lower property taxes."' Third, Munfund
would spread the burden of cleanup costs over a large
group: all those who pay federal income taxes. Spreading
the burden over all taxpayers would minimize the degree of
inequity suffered by any individual taxpayer. Fourth, the
tax burden associated with Munfund will be borne not only
by all those who created the problem, but also by all those
who benefit from the ensuing cleanups: society at large."'
Finally, Munfund would require individual contributions
only from those who pay federal income taxes.
Fourth, the tax should minimize the potential for litiga-
tion by affected parties."r Munfund would provide little,
if any, opportunity for litigation regarding tax liabilities,
especially since the tax base for Munfund would be clearly
defined.'7
Fifth, the tax should complement the overall regulatory
scheme. 74 One of the primary goals of CERCLA is to
have the parties responsible held liable for the attendant
cleanup costs. 5 Since Munfund would effectuate the
"polluter pays" principle underlying CERCLA by requiring
all those responsible for the disposal of MSW to contribute
to the costs of its clean up, it would significantly foster the
169. Id.
170. Paul R. Portney, Who Should Pay?, 17 EPA 1. 33, 37 (1991).
171. See Carlson & Bausell, supra note 158, at 111. While society at large will appre-
ciate the benefits of a clean environment, those residing near a site that is remediated
most likely will benefit the most. However, Munfund would facilitate the cleanup of all
NPL sites containing MSW, and therefore would directly benefit municipal residents across
the nation.
172. Id. at 109.
173. Id. at 120 (commenting that broad-based taxes, such as Munfund, leave little op-
portunity for dispute).
174. Id. at 109.
175. See B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
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effectiveness of CERCLA.
Finally, the tax should promote economic efficiency,
create incentives for waste reduction, and foster alternative
disposal methods as a means of minimizing the future costs
of the program.75 Because Munfund is a broad-based tax,
the impact on individual taxpayers would most likely be
relatively small, especially since Munfund is not related to
waste generation." While Munfund alone would not
achieve the necessary change in current disposal practices,
if supplemented by aggressive environmental education, it
has the potential to achieve the desired effect. 78 Requir-
ing all taxpayers to contribute to MSW clean up and in-
forming taxpayers that there are safer disposal alternatives
available could operate as an incentive to alter current
disposal practices.'79 By compelling taxpayers to pay for
the damage caused by past disposal, they would understand
the extent to which their actions affect the environment and
they would begin to realize the importance of proper dis-
posal practices.
Moreover, with respect to the environment, it is clear
176. See Carlson & Bausell, supra note 158, at 108-10.
177. One of the more frequently proposed solutions to the MSW disposal problem is a
waste-end tax, which is assessed based upon the actual amount of waste disposed, and
which may vary according to the type of waste or the disposal methods employed. See
Carlson & Bauscll, supra note 158, at 106-08 (discussing of waste-end taxes); see also
Michelle L. Washington, A Proposed Scheme of Municipal Waste Generator Liability, 100
YA.E L. 805, 822-23 (1990) (proposing a household-variable waste tax). While a waste-
end tax would achieve economic efficiency by forcing individuals to internalize the costs
of waste disposal, it creates several significant problems that a program such as Munfund
would avoid. First, in order for a waste-end tax to create the necessary incentives, it must
be set high enough to offset any advantage of other available and less desirable disposal
techniques. See Carlson & Bausell, supra note 158, at 117-18. This, unlike Munfund,
might require substantial individual contributions. A waste-end tax also creates significant
problems in terms of administrative feasibility, especially with respect to collection of the
tax and the information required to assess it. Id. at 115-16. While a waste-end tax can
initially generate sufficient funds, its success in altering disposal methods will significantly
reduce the stability of its waste stream over time. ld. at 117. Moreover, the imposition of
a waste-end tax may result in increased litigation. Id. at 120. Finally, a waste-end tax
may create a perverse incentive and result in illegal waste disposal practices.
178. Anthony D. Cortese, Toward Environmental Responsibility: How Do We Become
Literate?, 17 EPA 1. 31, 31 (1991) (commenting that a change in the relationship of
humans to the environment will require a significant societal effort in environmental edu-
cation).
179. If individuals are made aware of the fact that they are paying to clean up the
damage created by past disposal practices, they might be more inclined to alter their
current practices so that they will not have to pay in the future.
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that prevention is much less expensive than
remediation.' 0 Therefore, an additional catalyst to the
modification of current disposal practices would be the
creation of a comprehensive, nationally mandated solid
waste management program that emphasizes preventive
measures such as source reduction and recycling. Federal
statutes do not currently require any comprehensive regula-
tion of MSW." An increasing number of states and mu-
nicipalities have developed household hazardous waste man-
agement programs on their own initiative, but the imple-
mentation of such programs is strictly voluntary." Fur-
thermore, efforts to manage solid waste disposal vary from
state to state,183  and are not necessarily consistent with
solving the national disposal problem.' 4 Therefore, since
the problem is national in scope, the implementation of a
comprehensive federal solid waste management program
would be a significant step towards eliminating, or at least
substantially reducing, future municipal liability.'as
180. See Cortese, supra note 178, at 32 (acknowledging that focus should be placed on
anticipating and preventing pollution, rather than on controlling and remediating it).
181. Paula L Meske, The Solid Waste Dilemma: Municipal Liability and Household
Hazardous Waste Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 355, 355 (1993) (proposing that Congress
mandate regulation of household hazardous waste). The EPA has recently issued solid
waste disposal facility criteria, which provide minimum federal standards for MSW land-
fills, including location restrictions, facility design and operating criteria, groundwater
monitoring requirements, corrective action requirements, financial assurance requirements,
and closure and post-closure requirements. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 40
C.F.R. §§ 257-58 (1991). While this is a step in the right direction, it is only a small
step. This strategy concentrates only on preventing the problems caused by waste in land-
fills, rather than on reducing the amount of waste that reaches landfills.
182. -Meske, supra note 181, at 358 (noting that EPA supports such programs, but has
not played a strong role in their evolution); see also Meyers, supra note 1, at 569 (stat-
ing that §§ 6942-49 of RCRA provide guidelines for the implementation of state plans for
the treatment and disposal of MSW, but compliance with the guidelines is voluntary).
183. Ann R. Mesnikoff, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause Barrier: Keeping
Waste at Home, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1230 (1992) (noting that there is no uniformity
among state approaches). When municipalities undertake responsibility for solid waste
management, a variety of problems ensue. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 596. Munici-
palities often lack the funds and expertise necessary to implement successful programs.
See id. Furthermore, municipal officials can be influenced by a variety of political factors,
and might therefore be inclined to adopt a program which makes everyone happy. Id.
184. Michael R. Harpring, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage: Municipal Solid Waste and
the Need for Congressional Action, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 851, 876 (1991).
185. Since the adoption of a program such as Munfund would eliminate any deterrent
effect on municipalities, which the current system of individual liability might provide,
federal solid waste management standards could play an important role in the implementa-
CLEANING UP THE MESS
3. Cleaning Up the Mess
The creation of Munfund would eliminate the inequities
inherent in the current scheme of individual municipal
liability under CERCLA. As a result of the decision in
B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha,186 third party contribution ac-
tions against municipalities will increase. Under the current
CERCLA liability scheme, municipalities that are found
liable are individually responsible for paying the extremely
high costs of cleanup. These costs will be paid directly by
the residents of these municipalities, most likely through
property tax increases. It is far more equitable to spread the
costs of cleanup among everyone, regardless of where they
reside. This is precisely what Munfund would accomplish.
No one municipality or group of residents would be re-
quired to bear excessive liability, and municipalities would
be freed from the potentially crippling effects of CERCLA
liability. The creation of Munfund would also facilitate
cleanup efforts. The existence of an established fund, spe-
cifically for the purpose of financing municipal liability and
replenished annually from income tax revenues, would
allow cleanups to begin immediately after municipalities are
found liable because it would eliminate the need to delay
the commencement of cleanup efforts until the necessary
funds are raised.'
While some might contend that the residents of "good"
municipalities should not be required to contribute to the
cleanup costs incurred by "bad" municipalities, this argu-
ment does not seem sufficient to justify retaining the cur-
rent liability scheme. First, municipal liability under
CERCLA is extremely unpredictable. The fact that a mu-
nicipality is not currently facing CERCLA liability does not
mean that it is immune from such liability in the future.
Therefore, those who would advocate retaining the current
liability scheme assume a very real risk. While they may
consider themselves safe from having to contribute to
tion of such a program.
186. 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); supra part 1I.
187. See Jan M. Edelstein, Who Should Pay?, 17 EPA J. 33, 34 (1991) (commenting
that site-specific fund-raising makes it necessary for the government and private parties to
divert enormous resources, time, and money to identifying and negotiating or litigating
with PRPs to raise cleanup costs).
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cleanup costs because their municipality is not currently
threatened with CERCLA liability, the tables could very
easily turn. Then, if their municipality was later found
liable and required to raise cleanup costs, they would have
to pay an extremely high price to finance their
municipality's liability. Given a choice between a marginal
contribution to a national liability fund and a potentially
large contribution to the costs incurred by a liable munici-
pality, it is arguable that most would choose the former.
Furthermore, the creation of Munfund would foster the
"polluter pays" principle, and would provide a comprehen-
sive solution for what has now become a national dilemma.
The "polluter pays" principle dictates that the polluter, and
not the taxpayer, should pay to clean up environmental
damage. It has been established that everyday garbage
contains hazardous substances.'88 Consequently, residents
of all municipalities, merely by throwing their garbage
away, contribute to the problems caused by the disposal of
MSW. Therefore, in the context of municipal liability, the
polluter is the taxpayer.
Munfund would directly effectuate the "polluter pays"
principle because it would require all polluters (taxpayers)
to finance the cleanup of environmental damages caused by
the disposal of MSW. Although some might argue that
requiring all taxpayers to pay for the cleanup costs incurred
by individual municipalities would result in some taxpayers
paying for damage they did not cause, the hazardous nature
of MSW does not vary among municipalities, and MSW
does not lose its hazardous nature simply because it is
disposed of in one municipality rather than another. While
all taxpayers are polluters, the current CERCLA liability
scheme makes them pay only when the municipality in
which they reside is found liable. Therefore, some polluters
are required to pay, but others are not, and the "polluter
pays" principle again becomes nothing more than a conve-
nient means to justify an arbitrary imposition of liability.
Munfund, however, would require all polluters to pay, and
would thus eliminate the fortuitous immunity from liability
that some taxpayers currently receive based solely upon
188. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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where they reside.
Munfund would also eliminate the perceived need to
reduce the liability burden that municipalities must bear
under the current system. While given the immense costs
of cleanup, it may be desirable to reduce the amount that
individual municipalities are now required to pay, this will
no longer be necessary once a national trust fund is estab-
lished. Individual municipalities will not have to raise funds
to finance cleanups, and they will no longer be threatened
by the potentially devastating effects of CERCLA liability.
Moreover, municipalities should not be afforded special
treatment with respect to CERCLA liability;8 9 the only
thing this accomplishes is to shift the liability burden onto
other responsible parties. EPA should abandon its current
policy under which it will not routinely prosecute munici-
palities under CERCLA for the disposal of MSW."° The
existence of Munfund, financed directly by those who are
responsible for causing the damage, would place municipal-
ities in an ideal position to take responsibility. Enabling
municipalities to shoulder their proportionate share of
CERCLA liability would spread the costs of cleanup more
efficiently and equitably among responsible parties. The
fact that liability was being allocated more equitably, and
that each party was bearing its proportionate share of the
burden, would arguably foster a greater willingness on the
part of all responsible parties to contribute to cleanup ef-
forts because as more parties take responsibility, the burden
on each decreases.
VI. CONCLUSION
While municipal liability under CERCLA was originally
a local concern, it has evolved into a national problem.
Therefore, it requires a national solution. The consequences
of municipal liability have become too severe for individual
municipalities to manage. While it is beyond question that
the overall goal is to clean up the environment, this cannot
189. Giaccia & Belden, supra note 114, at 10431 (stating that special treatment for
municipalities overlooks the nature of MSW and distorts the purposes of CERCLA). "It
cannot be unfair to impose 'disproportionate' liability on municipalities, but fair if the
wastes come from an industrial source." Id at 10432.
190. See Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, supra note 2.
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be accomplished by jeopardizing the financial stability of
municipalities, especially when a viable alternative is avail-
able.
Munfund would not only achieve the goal of cleaning
up the environment, but it would also protect municipalities
from potential financial disaster. First, it would eliminate
the inequities inherent in the current CERCLA municipal
liability framework by spreading the costs of cleanup
among residents of all municipalities. Second, it would
effectively retain the "polluter pays" principle, because it is
premised on the notion that the disposal of MSW is a
nationwide problem, and that residents of all municipalities
must take responsibility and become a part of the solution.
Therefore, the creation of Munfund appears to be a neces-
sary and wise reform to the current scheme of CERCLA
liability.
While cost will inevitably be the greatest factor in
implementing such a solution, we must remember what we
are paying for, and we must acknowledge the need to take
responsibility. Only then will we be cleaning up the mess.
The man with the "story" probably said it best:
I tried to tell her how if you could not accept the past and
its burden there was no future, for without one there can-
not be the other, and how if you could accept the past you
might hope for the future, for only out of the past can you
make the future.9'
CHARRiSE MARE FRACCASCIA
191. WARREN, supra note 130, at 435.
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